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1 Introduction 
The argument of this paper is that in public debates, over a wide variety of issues and across 
different political contexts, participants tend to justify their arguments using a relatively limited set of 
moral principles. They do this to rally potential supporters and convince potential opponents by 
envoking principles that are widely shared - although interpreted in varying ways - by the participants 
in the debate. Following Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, we outline a typology of these 
principles and show how they form the common basis for justifying arguments in debates over two 
very different issues (globalization and local politics) and two political contexts (Finland and France). 
We make a contribution to two sociological literatures: the recently reinvigorated literature on 
the sociology of morality on the one hand, and the methodological literature on analyzing “framing” 
in textual material on the other. The empirical study of human morality – once presented as the core 
task of sociology by the likes of Emile Durkheim (1912; 1893) and Edward Westermarck (1908) – is 
experiencing a renaissance. Empirical studies on morality are now conducted by social psychologists 
(Haidt 2012), anthropologists (Robbins, 2012), political scientists (Abulof, 2013) and increasingly, 
again, by sociologists (Hitlin and Vaisey, 2010). In sociology, the most important development in this 
field is the emergence of the ‘sociology of valuation and evaluation’ (Lamont, 2011), on the rise in 
the US (eg Fourcade, 2011; Stark, 2009) and Europe (eg Adkins and Lury, 2011; Blokker, 2011). 
These recent approaches address morality through both theoretical currents and empirical 
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phenomena topical today, and connect the traditional sociological conceptions of morality to e.g. 
questions of justice, the world society, risk, work and family, economics, or the body (see Hitlin and 
Vaisey 2010). 
Perhaps the most important discursive field where competing moral evaluations are 
presented in modern democracies is the mass media. Opposing political parties, interest groups, 
social movements and other political actors present competing claims, and justify them based on a 
set of moral principles. The participants in public debate need to provide legitimate answers for 
questions like “why is the problem you are addressing important” and “how does the solution you 
propose contribute to the common good”, in short, justifications for their claims. The growing 
literature on moral sociology, however, has hardly looked at media texts, let alone presented a 
framework for systematically analyzing the use of moral principles of evaluation in the public sphere. 
Developing such methods is the aim of this paper. 
The literature on the methodology of text analysis, on the other hand, has remained rather 
superficial with regard to the moral content in media texts. The concept most widely used for 
analyzing the grounds given for political claims in the public sphere is that of a “frame”. Much work 
in sociology, political science and media studies has looked at how political actors frame their claims 
(Kriesi et al. 2012, 237-; Koopmans & Statham 2010; Entman 1995). In this literature “moral 
frames”, if present at all, play a marginal role. For example, according to one widely used definition, a 
moral frame is one that ‘contains a moral message or makes a reference to morality, God and other 
religious tenets’ (Neuman et al., 1992).  Neuman et al. contrast moral frames with four other kinds of 
frames, namely, economic, responsibility, human interest and conflict frames. Studies using their 
framework tend to systematically find that moral frames are the least common kind, even when the 
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topic of the debate analysed is one that could intuitively be thought of as “morally sensitive”, such as 
asylum seekers or climate change (d’Haenens and de Lange, 2001; Dirikx and Gelders, 2010). 
To arrive at a broader understanding of the moral content in public debates that contributes 
to the development of the sociology of morality, we draw on a foundational text in the field, De la 
justification by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (1991). Following Boltanski and Thévenot, we 
argue that justifying a claim, say, in economic terms, also amounts to taking a moral stand. To say 
that policy option A should be chosen over B because it is more beneficial in economic terms is not 
just a neutral, practical statement (or a practical way of “framing” the claim). It amounts to taking the 
moral stand that money is a relevant measure of worth and ought to be priviledged when policies are 
evaluated. 
This becomes especially evident in situations when monetary gain/loss is juxtaposed with 
some other measure of worth, such as equality. Some participants in a debate may argue that 
economic considerations should come first, while others may take the stand that equality, for 
example, in education or healthcare ought to be prioritized no matter what the cost in economic 
terms. This kind of conflict between economically justified arguments and those using equality 
justifications is, indeed, a moral conflict. 
In this paper, we propose an analytical framework, Justifications Analysis (JA), that bridges 
the literatures on moral sociology on the one hand and “framing” political claims in the public 
sphere on the other. The need to work at the intersection of these two literatures arose during 
conversations we had while working on two independent studies, one on the globalization debate in 
the mass media in Finland (Ylä-Anttila 2010), and the other on local political disputes in France and 
Finland (Luhtakallio 2012). We were struck by the similarity of justificatory repertoires in these two 
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very different issue fields and two political contexts. Differences, of course, existed, but it became 
clear they could be fruitfully understood in a broader framework of underlying similarities. That is, 
the differences were about combining and interpreting the same principles, rather than differences 
that would render the two issue fields and political contexts incommensurable. Inspired by these 
observations, we proceeded to organize a series of international workshops with the research group 
led by one of the two original developers of Justification Theory, Laurent Thévenot. The result of 
these workshops was the operationalization of our sociological intuition into the systematic analytical 
framework presented in this paper (see also Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011). 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we present the typology of moral justifications 
proposed by Boltanski and Thévenot and show how it can be operationalized to systematically 
analyze political claims in the public sphere. We then go on to demonstrate the usefulness of the 
method through two research examples, first on the globalization debate in Finland and then on 
local political conflicts in Finland and France. Finally, we discuss the usefulness and limits of JA, and 
its implications to the further development of the sociology of moral evaluations. 
2 From justification theory to analysing public debates 
Let us imagine a situation where city A announces that it is going to close down day care 
centre X. Parents whose children attend day care in this centre engage in a public struggle to save it 
from closing down. How can they justify their claims in public discussion? In what different ways 
can they argue that saving the centre serves the common good? Following Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1991), they have at their disposal at least the following seven principles of worthiness for building 
justifications for their arguments. These orders of worth – that all refer to the common good, 
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although in different ways – are based on different philosophical foundations concerning moral 
worth.  
Inspired worth. ‘The children’s creativity flourishes because the employees of the centre 
emphasize arts in the day care activities and create an inspiring atmosphere with their devoted 
approach to nursing’. The most well-known representation of inspired worth is St. Augustine’s The 
City of God (1972[1470]), in which spiritual commitment, independence and indifference towards 
both market goods measured with money and personal dependencies are considered worthy. In 
addition to religious devotion, this conception of the common good can be embodied, for example, 
by an artist or an environmentalist inspired by the greatness of nature (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991: 
201). 
Domestic worth. ‘The day care centre has been the heart of the neighbourhood for decades 
and its leader is respected by the whole community’. An important philosophical formulation of 
domestic worth can be found in the works of the eighteenth-century French philosopher Bossuet 
(1967 [1709]) and is based on tradition, personal relationships, inherited status, intimacy and 
hierarchy. A paradigmatic worthy person is a patriarchal head of the house or a prince who rules his 
subjects accordingly. This principle is also deployed when an argument is based on a position in a 
hierarchic institutional structure (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991: 207–208, 212, 215). 
The worth of fame. ‘The day care centre is well known and established by a famous, award-
winning paediatric.’. The worth of fame is drawn from Hobbes’ Leviathan (1999 [1651]). The measure 
of worth is the recognition gained from as many followers as possible. Celebrities and opinion 
leaders are therefore worthy figures (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991: 223–225). 
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Civic worth. ‘Children have the right to proper day care, and if this centre is closed down 
the children of the neighbourhood will be forced into an unequal position compared to other 
children in the city.’ Civic worth is most clearly present in Jean-Jacque Rousseau’s work The Social 
Contract (1997 [1762]). Solidarity, equality, the will of the people and collective wellbeing are ideas 
that invoke respect. Worthy persons are collectives, rather than individuals, and worthy things are 
mutually agreed conventions (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991: 231–233, 237, 240). 
Market worth. ‘Day care organized in small units will cost less than in larger ones’. Market 
worth is sketched out by Adam Smith in his work The Wealth of Nations (1776). Worth is measured 
simply by money. Worthy persons are those who possess the most fortune, and worthy acts are the 
ones that promote the production of the most material goods. The common good is a byproduct of 
profit (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991: 244–245, 250). 
Industrial worth. ‘The day care centre network has been designed by experts. It has been 
planned according to studies showing the benefits of small day care units to the development of the 
children’s language capacities’. The industrial order of worth values efficiency, planning that leads to 
efficiency, regulation, and scientific expertise. Saint-Simon is the classic political philosopher whose 
work presents this order of worth at its purest. A typical worthy person in this world is a skilful 
engineer who can design systems that work efficiently. Equally important is the measuring and design 
of social processes (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991: 252, 254, 259). 
Ecological worth. ‘If the day care centre is closed down, parents will have to take their 
children to day care at greater distance from their homes, often using their cars. This will increase 
pollution and accelerate climate change’. Ecological order of worth is a principle that gives intrinsic 
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value to nature and the natural environment, as well as their protection and conservation (Lafaye and 
Thévenot, 1993). 
These orders of worth form a relatively well institutionalized cultural toolkit for justifying 
claims in public debatesii by offering shared coordinates for actors, and therefore operating as means 
for reaching agreement. Thus, in any given non-violent conflict situation, all parties would be to 
some extent forced to acknowledge this variety of conceptions of common good, even if there was 
disagreement over which justification prevailed, or how. In the latter case, when the disagreement 
occurs within one order of worth, all parties agree on the criteria of justification, but disagree 
whether they are fulfilled. This is the case when, for example, actors agree that the procedure that 
produces (or saves) more money should be chosen out of two suggested procedures, but disagree on 
which one does; ie whether closing or keeping the famous day care centre is economically profitable 
to the city. In the case of two principles of worth clashing against each other, the conception of the 
common good based on one principle of justification is criticized according to criteria based on 
another; eg rather than the profitability of the day care centre, the basis of the decision should be the 
equal treatment of children living in different neighbourhoods.  
One of the key features in working with JA is taking into account the relations of different 
orders of worth within one argument. Boltanski and Thévenot consider these relations as 
denouncing (dénonciation) and compromising (compromis) principles of justification. There are, however, 
other ways of combining or relating different justifications; for example, the fictional example above 
can also serve for a case of different justification principles operating as arguments for one and the 
same claim without directly influencing each other.  
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In JA, the unit of analysis is a claim, an act made in public (cf. Koopmans and Statham, 1999). 
A claim can be a statement to the reporter, but also, for instance, a speech, a published report, a 
letter to the editor or a demonstration. Thus, a typical newspaper article contains numerous claims by 
different actors. Table 1 presents the coding of two claims from our two sets of research material. 
The first claim is reported as follows: ‘Protestors from all around the world have arrived to Seattle, 
attempting to prevent the meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In their view, WTO’s 
free trade policy will increase economic inequality in the world’ The second claims is reported as:‘The 
tenants of the city of Helsinki worry about their rights. In their view, the city’s plan to narrow tenants’ 
rights to participate in negotiations will result in the city raising rents’. Justifications Analysis breaks 
the claims into the following elements: 
Table 1. Coding a claim in Justifications Analysis 
Who: Speaker To whom: Addressee How: Means What: Content Why: 
Justification 
1: Civil society 
organization/ 
international 
 
2: Civil society 
organization / 
local 
1: Intergovernmental 
organization / 
international 
 
2: Political 
establishment / local 
1:Demonstration 
 
 
2: Statement 
1:WTO meeting 
must be stopped 
 
2: Tenants have 
the right to 
participate in 
decision making 
on rents 
1:Civic+ 
Market - 
 
2:Civic + 
Market - 
 
In JA, we code the claim makers (speakers) and addressees, as well as the means of 
claimsmaking and content of the claim. The core of the coding is the following three justification 
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variables: the worth that a given claim refers to, whether the reference is positive or negative and the 
potential combinations of different justifications.  
As is apparent by now, the most pronounced difference between the typical uses of “framing” 
as the basis for coding public debates and JA is that in the latter, the codes are not identified 
inductively from the data, but are based on a more or less fixed set of justification principles. Leaning 
on such relatively stable principles makes the approach particularly suitable for comparative research, 
as we will demonstrate in section 4, comparing Finland and France (see also Lamont and Thévenot 
2000). Seen through the lens of JA, the public sphere is an arena of contestation between competing 
moral principles. Studying public debates from this point of view becomes an exercise in 
understanding the moral constitution of modern societies as much as dissecting the details of 
particular debates. With JA, the moral principles that guide different political actors and projects are 
brought to spotlight. Thus, we want to stress the importance of understanding the consequences of 
the tools used in social research. It is crucial to develop and deploy sociological tools capable of 
bringing to light the moral components of, for instance, economistic public talk that likes to portray 
itself as morally neutral. 
3 Research example: The globalization debate in Finland 
How do certain arguments become successful in media debates? In this section, we will show that 
Justifications Analysis can be useful in addressing this question. We argue that success can be 
achieved by justifying one’s claims by invoking moral principles that are acceptable to potential allies 
and in some form, also to opponents. Thus, we look at three measures of success: (1) the salience of 
certain arguments and justifications, (2) the adoption of these arguments by a wide range of allies and 
(3) the acceptance of the arguments by potential opponents.   
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The research material used to illustrate these points is a sample of newspaper articles on 
globalization in Finland between 1999 and 2005iii. The mass media debate on globalization began 
with the challenge presented by the Global Justice Movement (GJM) that staged mass 
demonstrations and shut down the meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999. The 
activists forcefully made the claim that the current form of economic globalization results in 
prioritizing economic growth over just distribution and that the system of governing globalization is 
not organized according to democratic principles. These claims raise two kinds of civic justifications, 
those prioritizing equality and those prioritizing democracy, and denounce justifications that 
prioritize economic worth.  
‘The diverse NGOs…were all against the WTO’s idea that trade will generate wellbeing to 
the whole world…The activists want to limit free flows of goods, money and people, 
referring, for example, to human rights and environmental norms.’ HS 5.12.1999 
These justifications proved to be strong enough to politicize the concept of globalization and 
start a debate over the kinds of moral values that current processes of economic globalization and 
current institutional structures for governing these processes, such as the WTO were advancing. The 
mentions of the word globalization in the news went from 16 per year on average between 1988-
1998 to 150 in 1999 and 508 in 2005 – that is 1,4 times every day (see table 2). 
Table	  2	  Frequency	  of	  the	  keyword	  globalization	  in	  the	  news,	  1988-­‐2005 
Year N 
1988-1998 16* 
1999 150 
2000 255 
2001 417 
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2002 297 
2003 223 
2004 458 
2005 508 
*	  Average	  freguency	  per	  year	  during	  the	  10-­‐year	  period 
 Moreover, globalization became a phenomenon that was mainly discussed in the light of its 
implications for justice and democracy, rather than, for example, its economic implications. Table 3 
shows that 82 per cent of claims made about globalization in our sample were justified in civic terms, 
while only 55 per cent were justified in market terms. By our first measure, the salience of the issue 
of globalization and the share of civic justifications in the debate, the GJM and its arguments were 
successful. 
Table	  3.	  Share	  of	  claims	  using	  each	  justification,	  1999-­‐2005	  (%) 
Justification Share (%)* 
Domestic 2 
Fame 3 
Civic 82 
Market 55 
Industrial 18 
Ecological 10 
N 1217 
*	  The	  total	  shares	  add	  up	  to	  more	  than	  100%	  because	  each	  claim	  can	  include	  several	  justifications 
The arguments of the GJM and their justifications were also successful in a second sense: 
they were adopted by a significant number of influential political allies. But in order to achieve this 
success, the GJM activists had to adopt a wider repertoire of justifications. A simple denonciation of 
economic worth from the perspective of civic worth – saying that globalization of the economy is 
bad and globalization of justice and democracy is good – would not do. Instead, the main argument 
of the movement became that “to advance the common good, global markets need democratically 
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agreed rules of the game”. This argument is based on thinking that three orders of worth, economic 
(growth of the world economy), civic (democratic means of agreeing on the rules) and industrial 
(regulation based on scientific planning) can support each other.  
This version of the argument for global justice and democracy was successful because it 
invoked a set of justifications that appealed to a wide range of political actors. A Green Party MP 
argued:  
‘Our aim is to create global rules of the game that curb the restless movements of 
capital and the unemployment and insecurity that are consequences of these 
movements’ (HS, 26 September 1999).  
These kinds of arguments also found some resonance in the Trade Unions, in Finland and 
internationally, and made their way to the very top of the political hierarchy. The President of the 
Republic, a Social Democrat, headed the International Labour Organization’s World Commission on 
the Social Dimension of Globalization with the President of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa. The two 
presidents argued, in an op-ed on the publication day of the Commission’s report:  
‘Just globalization requires building international institutions that represent the 
interests of all…We must prioritize sustainable economic growth...social goals and just rules 
of trade and finance.‘ HS 25.2.2004 
A particularly interesting variant of this type of argumentation was the idea of the so-called 
Tobin Tax, also known as the currency transaction tax. The idea was promoted by the French-born 
global justice organization Attac that became very successful in Finland upon its launch. The idea 
was to make global financial markets generate wealth for humanity (market justification) by 
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establishing a democratically controlled institution (civic justification) that levies a cleverly engineered 
tax on currency transactions (industrial justification) and redistributes the wealth to development 
needs globally (civic justification). This combination of three justifications, as we have seen, was 
successful in itself in many ways. In addition to this winning combination, the success of the idea of 
the Tobin Tax was further helped by adding yet another kind of justification – that of fame. The tax 
was initially proposed in the 1970’s by the economics Nobel Laureate, James Tobin. Not only was he 
a word famous authority on the financial markets, but also a mainstream neoclassical economist. His 
fame and scientific authority thus went far beyond the left wing social movement organizations that 
resurfaced his old idea.  
In a poll in 2001, 70 per cent of MPs in Finland were in favor of the Tobin Tax (Ojala 2001). 
In 2015, quite some time after the resurfacing of the idea in the late 1990’s, the European Union is in 
the process of adopting a version of the tax (Strupczewski 2015). The idea, thus, served as a 
discursive tool to the Global Justice Movement activists to draw mainstream attention to their other 
demands, but also succeeded in changing legislation.  
Finally, the ‘rules of the game‘ argument was also successful in the third sense of the term 
introduced above: it convinced not only allies but also many initial opponents. The acceptance of the 
idea of the Tobin Tax across party lines was one example of this. Another one was an op-ed by the 
Finnish representative of the International Chamber of Commerce, an organization very much in 
favor of the kind of free trade agreements that the GJM initially rose to oppose. For a while around 
the turn of the millennium, the acceptance of the rules of the game argument and its triple 
justification of market-civic-industrial, was so successful that even this former opponent felt the need 
to say: 
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‘Businesses do not want to see deregulation leading to savage markets…the liberalization of 
world trade must continue, but in an internationally regulated and controlled manner. The 
WTO and UN are examples of institutions which can develop common rules of the 
game.‘ (HS, 27 May 2001). 
In sum, Justifications Analysis is useful for understanding why some arguments become 
successful in public debates. When political actors are willing and able to modify their arguments to 
lean on a wide enough range of moral justifications and thus resonate with a wide range of allies and 
sometimes opponents, they are more likely to succeed.  
4 Research example: Local disputes in Finland and France 
In our second research example, we analyse local disputes between citizens and city officials. 
The data consists of reports of such disputes in local newspapers in Helsinki and Lyoniv. Local 
newspapers have a particularly strong role in providing their readers with tools to imagine and re-
imagine the community they live in, and representing the ‘common’ in terms of disputes over the 
common good (cf. Thévenot 2006). Therefore, in order to understand the definition struggles 
concerning the common good comparatively, we asked what kind of disagreements attracted public 
attention, and how they were represented in these newspapers. Construction plans and sites, zoning, 
and different public services were common sources of conflict, but more explicitly value-laden topics 
like minority rights, interpretations of laws, and grounds for legitimate decision-making were also 
often debated. The themes of dispute also varied between the two contextsv: In Helsinki, the big 
issue at the time of the study were budgetary cuts targeted at the school network In Lyon, the foci 
were multiple. Some topics that attracted much attention were the installation of parking meters and 
abolition of free-of-charge parking, the living conditions and the right to education of the children of 
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undocumented immigrants, and the repeated disappointments and difficulties met in the work of 
neighbourhood councils. The topics of dispute were, nevertheless, not the most captivating point of 
comparison. Instead, it was the ways in which different positions and opinions were justified in the 
local public spheres in Lyon and Helsinki.  
When a group of parents in Finland opposed the city’s plans to close down a local primary 
school, they claimed that the plan was based on inaccurate demographic statistics. When a group of 
residents in France opposed plans to install parking meters to their neighbourhood, they grounded 
their opposition in claiming that the city’s plan was unjust and treated residents of different city 
districts unequally. Overall, the Finnish claim makers relied most willingly on arguments based on 
expertise, efficiency and scientific knowledge. The French claim makers counted most of all on 
argumentation based on equality, justice and solidarity. These justifications, based on industrial worth 
in the former case and civic worth in the latter, were the most prevalent in the articles dealing with 
local disputes. They also formed the central axis describing the differences between the Finnish and 
the French data.  
Civic justifications appeared in their purest form in the claims of civic actors who stipulated 
the fulfilment of rights and democratic rules and laws, as illustrated in the following claim from the 
French data: 
Demonstrators against assaults on the freedom of expression: The demonstrators protest 
against police violence, arbitrary arrests and abusive imprisonments in recent demonstrations, 
because these are attacks against the basic rights and liberty of expression (LP, May 19, 2005). 
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The abovementioned protest built on the idea of shared democratic values and mutually 
agreed rules: police conduct was denounced solely on the basis that the freedom of speech and other 
basic rights cannot be neglected, as they are principles of high civic worth. It was not denounced, for 
instance, by insisting for more efficient training of crowd management in the police forces, which 
would have been an industrial justification. 
Civic justifications were also recurrently combined with other justifications, a feature that 
brought up significant differences between the two contexts. In the Finnish context civic and 
industrial justifications were often combined, as in the following excerpt: 
The teachers’ union wants to clear out the legality of school policies in Vantaa. The local 
teachers’ union insists that the legality (civic) of the planned cutbacks in schools have to be re-
examined (industrial), and that the municipal council must further debate the matter (civic), 
because saving money through cutbacks leads to impossible working conditions for teachers 
(industrial), and possibly to practices violating the law on primary education (civic) (HS, April 27, 
2005). 
Industrial justifications were common in both contexts, but in the French data they were 
hardly ever used as the single justification, but rather in combination with others. In the Finnish data, 
in contrast, a citizen group could ground its claim solely on industrial worth and thus fully utilize the 
‘expert card’, as in the example below: 
The Finnish Nature Protection League and a local environmental association claim that the 
city’s proposition of gasworks cannot be built as a power plant as planned, because recycling 
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waste in this way turns it into an incineration plant, which requires the installation of specific 
types of filters (HS January 18, 2005). 
Even though few citizen justifications deployed the industrial justification to this degree, 
references to statistics and scientific studies recurrently formed a central part of the argument in the 
Finnish data. 
In the Finnish disputes, both citizens and city representatives eagerly invoked the industrial 
order of worth in their arguments. The same holds for civic worth in France. In the Finnish data, a 
quarter of the citizens’ and almost half of the city representatives’ justifications were industrial. 
Hence, both sides relied on justifications based on efficiency, quality and expertise. In the French 
data, more than a third of the citizens’ and nearly half of the city representatives’ justifications 
referred to civic worth. Common denominators were justifications based on law, civil rights, 
deliberation and solidarity. The industrial worth in Finland and the civic worth in France formed, 
respectively, the ‘common ground’ – an array of justifications that both sides of the dispute 
considered either right and suitable, or strategically reasonable, if not unavoidable. 
This ‘common ground’ did not mean resolution or consensus. Instead, it produced what 
Boltanski and Thévenot call tests, in which the opponents argue on similar grounds. The following 
examples from the Finnish data illustrate this by way of a dispute portraying a compromise between 
industrial and market worth. 
A: The representative of the municipal education department asked for constructive 
suggestions concerning the reduction of the number of schools – if the school spaces cannot 
be objects of cutbacks, something else will have to be cut, because as the number of pupils will 
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decrease in the future (industrial), the price per capita (of primary education) cannot rise 
(market). 
B: The citizens call for more clarity in the calculations (industrial) and actual need for saving 
(market), as the statistics and prognosis concerning the number of pupils are currently 
controversial (industrial) (HS March 9, 2005). 
The citizens attempted, firstly, to prove the city representatives’ industrial justification wrong 
by claiming that their calculations were based on inaccurate statistics, thus relying on the very same 
statistics instead of, for example, holding the city representatives accountable for trampling upon 
children’s rights by referring to statistics. Secondly, the citizens questioned the market justification 
made by the city by calling for proof of this ‘austerity argument’. 
In the French data, disputes took a similar form, but often within the civic order of worth, 
testing its criteria: 
Gerland and urban planning: the encounter of inhabitants and representatives 
A: The inhabitants of Gerland demand that the decisions concerning the area’s urban 
development have to be made in accordance with their demands, because in a democracy, the 
representatives must follow the will of the people, and listen to what they want, and the 
citizens’ words have to be taken into account. 
B: The councilor in charge states that a consensus has to be found, and that the councilors 
have to make the basic decisions after which the citizens can be consulted, because the 
councilors have been mandated for decision-making (LP April 21, 2005). 
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The inhabitants appealed to general rules of democracy in justifying their claims about the 
plans – instead of, for example, relying on industrial justifications about efficiency and suitability of 
the plans for their district. In fact, their justification resembled a ‘democratic governance check list’, 
one not very concretely connected to the case at hand. The representative, on the other hand, 
questioned the inhabitants’ interpretation of democracy, and used a civic justification to construct a 
claim for representative democracy.  
The ‘common ground’ we observed in these local disputes leads us to reflect upon the impact 
of political culture: different justifications appear to be culturally successful in Finland and in France. 
Be it a library threatened of closing, or heavy savings targeted to preliminary schools, the Finnish 
mode of argumentation often treated these as questions of efficiency and technical expertise. Or, 
when they did appeal to civic justifications, they emphasized legality and contracts more than 
solidarity and rights. In the French data, civic worth had more amplitude, and justifications based on 
civic worth emphasized the aspects largely missing from the Finnish disputes.  
In sum, using JA to analyse the local disputes helped us to discover the “toolkits” of local 
and national political cultures that everyone knows how to use, or at least understands to be essential 
in public debate. The different grounds of justification in the two contexts provided for different 
grounds of raising the level of generality, and politicizing. The civic justifications seemed to be closer 
to the arenas of politics altogether, whereas the technical facts the Finns argued about were 
sometimes neutralized to a point in which it seemed it was a mere misunderstanding between two 
experts whether a library should be closed or not. So, in the newspaper representation of local 
conflicts, the crucial conflicts resided in different worlds – in France, in the civic world, in Finland in 
the industrial world – making them very different conflicts with very different consequences 
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altogether. The matter-of-fact, engineering-like industrial worth was the ‘common ground’ on which 
the parties of the Finnish local disputes understood each other the best, whereas the civic world with 
its groundings on solidarity, equality, and fairness were the most common ‘meeting point’ in the 
French conflicts – the city representatives used civic justifications even more abundantly than the 
citizens. This analysis drew portraits of ‘the civic French’, relying on solidarity-based justifications, 
and ‘the industrial Finns’, trusting in rational-functional justifications. 
In both cases, however, the citizens seemed to be somewhat forced to justify on the shared 
grounds. The French were stuck with continuous ‘reality tests’ within the civic world, accused of 
being too domestic, or civic in a wrong way by their adversaries. The Finns were prone to back up 
even the strongest civic justifications with industrial ‘facts’, and however capable they were of expert 
argumentation they still were on the defense. Thus, in both cases, even if the citizens got their voices 
heard in the newspapers, they were the underdogs that had to try all possible arguments in order to 
convince the opposing party. 
As for the implications of such analyses, they enable an in-depth discussion on the 
relationship between national political cultures and democracy, and therefore a comparison of the 
moral groundings of democratic practices and the opportunities for politicization. In other words, 
they tell not only about whether, but also about how does democracy work or fail in different contexts.  
5 Theoretical contributions to further development of the justification framework: 
Subcategories and combinations 
Above, we have shown how justification theory can be operationalized to analyse public 
debates. Our empirical studies using this approach also point out possibilities to further develop the 
theory itself. The most central notions in this regard relate to, first, the possibilities of dividing and 
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combining the orders of worth and, second, identifying power relations, and henceforth the 
contextual opportunities to open issues for politicization, and to succeed in bringing forth one’s 
arguments in the public sphere, by asking who gets to define which of the orders are dominant. 
Most methods of textual analysis, including several variants of discourse and frame analysis, 
derive their categories inductively from the research material. One typical example of the type of 
findings such studies tend to report are the ‘five predominant frames’ which ‘emerge from the 
interactive relationship between social movements and the mass media’ (Boykoff, 2006, 201). This is 
of course informative of the public debate – here the early protests of the Global Justice Movement 
– in question, but draws only a limited picture of what are the meanings and values at stake in the 
debate. What kind of moral evaluations lay behind the (supposedly journalist-led) frames Boykoff 
identifiesvi as the discursive forces delegitimizing the protesters’ cause? And what about the 
protesters, what is worthy for them, why were they fighting this then seemingly desperate battle 
against global financial institutions? With JA, the battle of meanings that goes on in the public sphere 
is made evident, as the justifications of different actors are considered; not only the ones that 
“determine” the frame. Clearly, some party often dominates a public debate, but this is exactly why 
analysing the political and moral dimensions of the arguments is crucial. Hence, the analysis of what 
is going on in a public debate becomes more nuanced when (also the dominating) arguments are 
analysed as subject to tests between different moral values. Furthermore, with JA, sociological 
analysis avoids the risk of neutralizing the dominant discourse that is often portrayed as apolitical in 
mainstream public sphere, and instead, can fully incorporate the power dynamics of public debates 
(for a critique of the neglect of power in framing literature, see e.g. Carragee & Roefs 2004).  
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In contrast to mainstream inductive approaches to “framing”, JA starts with the seven 
predefined categories of the justification theory. Perhaps the most important insight of the theory, 
based on Boltanski and Thévenot’s empirical studies, is that people in everyday disputes and political 
conflicts in the public sphere tend to resort to a relatively limited number of moral principles, which 
have also been elaborated throughout the history of modern political philosophy. Beginning with this 
kind of relatively stable set of principles has the advantage that it encourages one to see how today’s 
disputes are related to more general discussion about moral principles, much of which is repeated 
(and gradually evolves) over long periods of time. vii Using a theoretically constructed set of 
categories has another advantage over approaches that draw the categories inductively from the 
research material: it enables comparisons between cases, be it countries or different public debates 
within the same country. If categories are drawn from the material by each case study separately, 
systematic comparison across cases is difficult and accumulation of knowledge about things such as 
political cultures is limited. Our approach presents one way of addressing these limitations. 
Moreover, justifications analysis is by no means limited to looking for the occurrence of 
these seven categories in the data. Instead, Boltanski and Thévenot’s original categories can be 
divided further as necessary, and their combinations are not limited to compromises and 
denunciations. The need to divide the orders of worth into subcategories came up in both of our 
case studies, especially regarding civic justifications. In the globalization debate civic claims were 
divided into democracy claims on the one hand, and equality claims on the other. In the local 
disputes it was clear that civic justifications were used in very different ways in Finland and in France. 
In the globalization debate democracy justifications represent the procedural side of civic 
worth. According to arguments based on this type of justification, the biggest problem regarding 
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globalization is that no democratic institutions exist for its governance. The other side of civic worth 
– arguments demanding a more equal distribution of income – focuses on the outcomes of 
globalization instead of governance procedures. The question is what consequences does 
globalization have for the distribution of income between and within countries, and for the 
mechanisms of taxation and redistribution.  
Our second research example revealed important differences in the use of civic justifications 
in Finland and France. Whereas Finns emphasized laws and commonly agreed contracts when 
resorting to civic justifications, the French emphasized solidarity, equality between citizens and the 
significance of democratic participation. Regardless of this difference, the civic justifications in both 
countries clearly sprouted from the same root. By accounting for this variation in the use of civic 
justifications, we were able to deepen the results of our comparative analysis. The differences reflect 
the profoundly different conceptions held in the two political cultures about democracy, the 
collective understanding of the role of citizens and the different starting points of social bonds and 
solidarity (see Luhtakallio 2012). This observation describes the sensitivity of JA as a tool for 
comparative analysis. The method lends itself to examining cultural differences and similarities at 
different levels, from simple frequencies of the use of different justifications to delicate tones of 
cultural variations. 
Another way to sensitize JA to the specificities of the data at hand is to focus on the different 
combinations of the orders of worth. Based on the two forms of combinations presented by 
Boltanski and Thévenot, compromise and denunciation, it is possible to form 42 pairs from the seven 
orders. When one includes cases where a compromise is formed between three orders of worth or 
where, for example, a compromise between two orders is denounced from the viewpoint of a third 
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order, the number of possible combinations increases to hundreds. Moreover, both of our case 
studies revealed ways of combining justifications beyond denunciations and compromises.  
Analysing the globalization debate, we found that two justifications are often combined by 
saying that one is a consequence of the other. In other words, it is claimed that the common good as 
defined in one order of worth automatically results from policies promoting the good as defined in 
another. Some participants in the globalization debate argued that promoting the market good 
automatically leads to an increase in civic good, while others had the opposite view of this relation. 
The first argument claims that markets produce democracy. In an op-ed dealing with China’s 
membership in the WTO, this relationship is presented as something resembling a law of nature: 
‘Liberalization of the economy is always followed by demands for other rights’ (HS November 25, 
1999). According to this conception, China’s WTO membership will eventually result in the collapse 
of the rule by a single party. Thus, the best way to promote democracy in China is to liberalize the 
economy. On rare occasions in the globalization debate, this idea about the relationship of civic and 
market worth is reversed. It is argued that redistribution of income does not hinder economic 
growth, as neoclassical economic theory would claim, but, to the contrary, promotes it. Such 
Keynesian thinking was very important in the building of Nordic welfare states, including Finland, 
beginning in the 1950s. In the 2000s, the number of Finnish actors making this argument is 
surprisingly low. But as it happens, the World Bank, criticized heavily by the GJM for its hostility to 
social policy, does take up this argument – perhaps as a reaction to the widespread criticism of its 
programs around the world. The main theme of the Bank’s World Development Report 2005 is equality. 
A journalist summarizes the report as follows: 
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The message of the report is simple: a good social and educational policy which provides 
equal possibilities for all, is also good economic policy. It makes possible the full use of the 
nation’s resources, raises national economic productivity, and accelerates economic growth 
(HS September 22, 2005). 
This example shows how JA helps in relating current public debates not only to the long 
history of political thought, but also to the more recent history of public debates about the same 
topic, increasing the potential for the accumulation of knowledge through linking several case studies 
that all use the same framework. 
In the analysis of local disputes, we observed claims that combined orders of worth into 
more or less firm couplings. The couplings were combinations of justifications that did not alter the 
orders of worth, like in a compromise, or test their internecine supremacy, like in a denunciation-type 
combination. Citizen claim makers’ use of coupling justifications was more frequent than city 
representatives’. 
In the Finnish case, citizen claim makers justified their claims with a civic-industrial and/or 
market coupling so commonly that this combination rose to symbolize the ensemble of their claims. 
These couplings followed a fairly similar pattern in which the claim was justified with a coupling of 
justifications grounded, on the one hand, on laws and contracts, and on the other hand, on efficiency 
and quality and/or economy and savings. Civic justifications used by citizens seem ‘natural’: for 
example, in the case of a local tenant association demanding that the city should not change the code 
of tenement blocks because it would hamper resident democracy. In contrast, the frequent coupling 
of civic justifications with industrial and market ones raises the question whether this coupling is due 
to strategic necessity. The association also argued that a change in the code would hamper the 
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efficient maintenance of the houses (industrial), and that resident democracy produces notable 
savings for the city in lower repair and maintenance costs (market). This form of coupling was 
recurrent in Finnish local disputes: citizens rarely justified their claims exclusively in terms of 
democracy, law or their rights as citizens, but almost always coupled their arguments with other types 
of worth, usually industrial or market. 
Locating and interpreting the couplings helped us examine the question of power relations in 
the disputes. In Finland and France, the most recurrently deployed ways of justifying reflected not 
only cultural meaningfulness but also a degree of coercion, especially for the citizen claim makers 
who often had to settle for the terms of dispute – the orders of worth – set by the opposing party. 
Premises of justification theory include that everyone possesses the ‘critical capacity’ to use the 
orders of worth to justify claims, and that the orders are equal in the sense that claims invoking one 
order of worth are, in principle, as strong as those invoking any of the others. Our empirical analyses 
of public disputes raise the following question: how can these premises be fulfilled in empirical 
situations where the parties of the dispute are not equal in scope, resources or power potential? 
Another example from the Finnish data, with a citizen group justifying their claim with an industrial-
market coupling, illustrates the question: ‘The inhabitants of Viherlaakso state that the district library 
has to be preserved, because its annual costs are not high, and its discontinuation would not bring 
the city big savings’ (HS May 24, 2005).  
The inhabitants’ coupling of justifications to defend their library is startling. One can easily 
think of justifications based on civic worth in defence of a library, but instead, the inhabitants relied 
on the industrial worth to exhibit their expertise regarding the annual expenditure of public libraries 
and the scale of the city’s budget, while also reinforcing their claim with the cold market fact that 
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closing down the library would not amount to notable savings. In this coupled justification the 
power relations seem to affect the citizen claim makers: they operate within an agenda set by power 
holders.  
In the French data, in contrast, justifications that seemed constrained appeared within the 
civic worth. Recurrently, a city representative would justify her/his position based on the principles 
of participatory democracy. The citizens opposing the claim then presented another civic justification 
– instead of, for example, uttering an industrial argument that the procedures of participatory 
democracy were dysfunctional. In Finland, the common ground seemed to be set by the bureaucratic 
rule of a political culture where citizens are not easily given the role of political actors, whereas in 
France, the rigid political hierarchy underlying the Republican rhetoric of egalitarian politics resulted 
in a somewhat uneasy coerciveness of the civic order of worth.  As these examples illustrate, 
analysing different combinations of orders of worth and tracing recurrent features in these 
combinations makes it possible to develop the capacity of justification theory to take into account 
context specific power relations, and to shed light on how politicization processes occur, succeed, 
and fail. Understanding of the latter is of crucial importance in examining democratization and also 
multiple current challenges in “old” democracies (se Luhtakallio, 2012). 
6 Conclusions 
We have written this article with the conviction that the best way to present a research 
method is to show how it works. Hence, we introduced the JA by presenting its use in two empirical 
studies, highlighting the different possibilities of data, scope and measure of analysis, as well as the 
axes of interpretation the method opens. Analyzing the globalization debate in Finland, we argued 
that arguments are more likely to become successful in the public sphere if they are supported by a 
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broad set of justifications, appealing to a wide range of potential allies and accepted, to some extent, 
by potential opponents.  Comparing Finnish and French local disputes, we found that in the former, 
both citizens and the decision makers resort to industrial justifications, emphasizing efficiency and 
expertise. In the latter, the civic worth provides a similar ‘common ground’ for justifying public 
claims, emphasizing civil rights, deliberative procedures and solidarity. 
We have presented Boltanski and Thévenot’s classification of seven orders of worth as one 
possible way of recognizing and understanding the moral dimension of conflicts in the public sphere 
– often left in the margins by conventional approaches to the study of framing. There is, of course, 
no reason to assume that the number of relevant categories should be limited to seven. Furthermore, 
as we have noted, it is important to proceed with caution with regard to the sensitivity of the 
framework towards non-Western cultural traits. 
This categorization, however, does have roots running through Western moral philosophy 
and is, consequently, widely recognized and utilized by a range of political actors across different 
settings. This, we have argued, makes the framework particularly suitable for comparisons between 
different debates, time periods and national contexts. If, on the one hand, systematic differences are 
found in the use of justifications across different debates within the same national context, relatively 
robust conclusions about persistent traits of political culture in that context can be drawn. If, on the 
other hand, ways of justifying arguments are found that form common ground across national 
political cultures, this opens the way to better understanding the possibilities of global public 
deliberation.
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i	  We’d like to thank Laurent Thévenot, Risto Alapuro, Markku Lonkila, Veikko Eranti,  Anna Kukkonen, Tomi 
Lehtimäki, Tuukka Ylä-Anttila, and other members of the Helsinki Research Group for Political Sociology, the three 
anonymous reviewers and all other colleagues who have given feedback on earlier versions of this work on a number of 
occasions.	  
ii This applies at least in the context of mediated public spheres of modern democracies. The extent to which 
moral talk even in these special circumstances is limited to the framework described by the seven orders of worth is, of 
course, an important question. We see this as an empirical question and point out ways to make the framework more 
flexible through our research examples in section 5.	  
iii  The data was selected through two-phase purposive sampling. First, nine key events in the debate, marked by 
peaks in the occurrence of the word ‘globalization’, were selected. Second, a qualitative reading of a part of the sample 
was used to generate a wider set of keywords referring to institutions (such as ‘WTO’, ‘G8'), phenomena (such as ‘trade’, 
‘liberalization’) and event locations (such as ‘Genoa’) associated with globalization, to capture also articles that discussed 
globalization withouth using the term itself. The newspaper’s online archive was then searched with this set of keywords 
for a period of one week before and three weeks after each event. This resulted in a sample of 491 articles in which a 
total of 717 claims were presented. The data include different types of articles: news reports, opinion pieces, and 
editorials. 
iv	  The data was collected from the newspapers Helsingin Sanomat (HS) and Le Progrès (LP) between January and 
June in 2005. It comprised 198 articles and 267 claims (Finland n=140, France n=127). Due to the different scope of the 
two newspapers, and in order to collect a comparable sample of notably local disputes, the Finnish data was collected only 
from the ‘City’ section of Helsingin Sanomat that concentrates only on the Helsinki region, while Le Progrès was covered in 
its entirety (Luhtakallio, 2012, 198). The data includes all articles (only reportage and news articles written by journalists 
were included, as opinions and editorials did not exist in the French data source) that concerned local conflict issues – 
participatory democracy, social movement actions addressing the city, encounters, deliberations, disagreements – and 
included an exchange between citizens (individuals or groups) and representatives of the city (politicians, office holders, 
mayors, spokespersons of municipal/regional institutions) (Luhtakallio, 2012, 198-199). The articles were collected by 
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using both digital and manual archives (microfilmed in the case of Helsingin Sanomat, bound in the case of Le Progrès). 
The digital archives were searched with a set of keywords related to local issues and participation (see Luhtakallio, 2012, 
217), and the analogical archives were read through at the level of titles. 	  
v For more details on the comparison of the two newspapers and the two cities, see Luhtakallio, 2012, 16-19, 
196-201.  
vi The frames identified by Boykoff were the Violence Frame, the Disruption Frame, the Freak Frame, the 
Ignorance Frame, and the Amalgam of Grievances Frame (Boykoff 2006, 211).	  
vii Indeed, the suggestions of the exploration worth and the project worth have been put forward (Auray and 
Vétel 2013; Boltanski and Chiapello 1999). These have not been included in our framework for reasons inherent to the 
critical debate about the justification theory: both suggestions are, in different ways, ‘special cases’ that do not quite 
follow the same pattern as the original six. However, the seventh, the ecological worth, does follow the same pattern in 
our reading (Lafaye and Thévenot 1993, for an extensive debate see Blok 2013). 	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